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Recent studies have revealed that cyber criminals tend to exchange
knowledge about cyber attacks in online social networks (OSNs).
Cyber security experts are another set of information providers
on OSNs who frequently share information about cyber security
incidents and their personal opinions and analyses. Therefore, in
order to improve our knowledge about evolving cyber attacks and
the underlying human behavior for diferent purposes (e.g., crime
investigation, understanding career development and business mod-
els of cyber criminals and cyber security professionals, prediction
and prevention of impeding cyber attacks), it will be very useful
to detect cyber security related accounts on OSNs automatically,
and monitor their activities. This paper reports our preliminary
work on automatic detection of cyber security related accounts on
OSNs using Twitter as an example, which may allow us to discover
unknown cyber security experts and cyber criminals for monitoring
purposes. Three machine learning based classiication algorithms
were applied and compared: decision trees, random forests, and
SVM (support vector machines). Experimental results showed that
both decision trees and random forests had performed well with an
overall accuracy over 95%, and when random forests were used with
behavioral features the accuracy had reached as high as 97.877%.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Today, online social networks (OSNs) are actively being used by
a huge number of users to share opinions and information on
diferent topics virtually over the Internet. They have the power of
gathering opinions, experiences or attentions in response to real-
world events from people all around the world. They can be great
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sources of useful information if efective algorithms are used. By
acquiring such rich data sources, it has been proven possible to
obtain valuable information about the efect and characterization
of many diferent ields such as natural disasters, disease epidemics,
and cyber attacks [2, 7, 12]. In this context, automatic user (account)
detection (classiication) has been a problem of signiicant interest
among researchers interested in OSNs. Twitter, one of the most
popular OSNs, has been subject to many such research studies,
which is used as the example platform in this paper as well.
One of the studies on automatic account classiication was done
by Pennacchiotti et al. in 2011 [11], with the aim of classifying
user accounts according to their interests on Twitter. The features
used fall into four categories: proile, messaging behavior, linguistic,
and social network features. The gradient boosted decision trees
were used as the classiication algorithm and it was reported that
the system had achieved good precision and recall values above
80%. Ωithin the study, the researchers proposed a methodology to
identify prototypical words that are typical lexical expressions for
people in a speciic class, which are then used as linguistic features
for classiication. In our study, we have adapted Pennacchiotti et
al.'s prototypical words algorithm to extract typical keywords used
by cyber security experts who are active on Twitter.
A major research topic related to automatic detection of cyber
security accounts is spam/spammer detection. It is a known fact
that cyber criminals have been using Twitter and other OSNs to
send spam, to conduct phishing attacks, and to spread malicious
code [4, 8, 13]. Consequently, discovering spammer accounts that
conduct such activities has been the subject of many studies. Many
of such studies use proile features (e.g., number of tweets, number
of followers/followees, age of the account), content features (e.g.,
n-grams, topic models) and linguistic features for the detection task
[4, 11, 14]. In this context, most commonly used machine learning
methods include SVM (support vector machines), decision trees
and random forests.
In one of the recent studies, Aswani et al. proposed an approach
to identifying spam proiles (fake followers) by combining social
media analytics and bio-inspired computing [3]. They have used
a set of 21 metrics under two categories (user and content based
metrics), most of which are also used in this study. It was reported
that the k-means integrated levy light irely algorithm (LFA) had
produced the best result with an accuracy of 97.98%.
Similar features have been leveraged by [1], Adewole et al. with
the aim of both spam and spammer detection. The researchers
applied a bio-inspired evolutionary search algorithm to identify
reduced features for spammer detection and ran several classiica-
tion algorithms where random forests were shown to be the best.
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In this study, predeined spam words have also been used as con-
tent based features. In our study we have extracted cyber security
related keywords automatically using three diferent techniques.
To the best of our knowledge, although there is plenty of work
on spam and spammer classiication, there is very little work on
classiication of cyber security related accounts. One such work was
done by Lee et al. with the aim of grouping a set of experts who have
highly contributed in the cyber security domain on Twitter and RSS
blogs [9]. Their primary research concern was to detect emerging
topics on cyber security with the help of automatically uncovering
diverse experts as new information providers. Besides using a list
of cyber security experts as seed accounts, they also selected a
number of new accounts that were mentioned in tweets or retweets
posted by accounts in that list. The accounts that have high topic
relevance are determined based on the number of related topics
given a predeined topics list. Those new accounts are then veriied
manually and added to the list of seed accounts. The whole list of
cyber related accounts is used to detect emerging new topics. Since
the identiication of cyber security related accounts is not the main
concern in Lee et al.'s study, this step is performed as a function of
querying the account's articles containing the given predeined seed
topics implemented in elastic search, which can limit the success of
the study due to the dependencies on the comprehensiveness and
representativeness of the predeined topics and the evolving nature
of the cyber security domain. As a comparison, our methodology
reported in this paper does not require manual extraction of any
cyber security related topics or keywords.
Another set of related work is on forensic analysis of cyber crim-
inals' activities on OSNs. For instance, in [5] Lau et al. reported a
weakly supervised machine learning method for detecting criminal
networks on OSNs including Twitter and online forums. Their work
focuses on conversational messages linking diferent users so the
topic difers from ours reported in this paper.
2 OURWORK
Due to the huge number of accounts on OSNs, it can take lots of hu-
man efort and normally requires some domain-speciic knowledge
to uncover accounts used by cyber security experts. In this paper,
such a task is done automatically using a machine learning algo-
rithm that learns a classiication model from labeled data with 22
selected metrics grouped under 3 main categories (proile features,
content features, and behavioral features). Unlike the current study,
none of the previous work has taken into consideration the follow-
ing two sets of features: lexical diversity, and cyber security related
keywords automatically extracted using 3 diferent methodologies
(prototypical words, weirdness and tf-idf values). Ωe use Twitter
as an example platform, but the features and methods reported in
the paper can be easily generalized to other OSNs.
2.1 Machine Learning Model
Main text categorization methods in the literature include SVM,
decision trees and random forests. In this work, these algorithms
were leveraged and their performances were compared in means
of accuracy, precision, recall and F1 scores. Implementations were
done using scikit-learn tool [10]. Experimental results were based
on 4-fold cross validation of the data. Diferent experiments were de-
signed to cover diferent sets of features to evaluate the importance
of the features in the classiication task. The radial basis function
(RBF) kernel is used for SVM. There are two parameters, which are
c and γ , to be considered while using the RBF kernel with SVM.
The parameter γ basically deines how each one of the training
examples inluence the results while the parameter c deines the
smoothness of the decision surface. In this work, c was set to 1.0
and γ was set to auto mode of scikit-learn.
2.2 Dataset
Ωe were not aware of any public dataset of cyber security related
accounts on Twitter, so we developed a crawler in Python, which
takes advantage of the Twitter API (https://developer.twitter.com/
en/docs). Cyber security related accounts were determined via Twit-
ter lists created by Twitter users. Twitter lists can be perceived as
a way of tagging people based on their interests. Cyber security
related keywords like łhackersž and łcyber security professionalsž
were used to identify cyber security related lists manually by the
authors of the paper. Those lists were then analyzed by an inde-
pendent cyber security professional (who is not a co-author of the
paper and had been working as a cyber security consultant for 7
years). As a result, 212 cyber security related accounts were vali-
dated. In order to have a balanced dataset, 212 ordinary accounts
that do not have a focus on cyber security were selected randomly
(also manually by the authors of the paper). Timelines of all the 424
accounts were crawled by using the Twitter API, leading to 3,200
tweets per account (which is the maximum number of tweets we
could extract per account through the API without paying a fee).
2.3 Features Used
For the classiication task, we used 22 metrics to produce features
of a given account on Twitter. Note that one metric may lead to
more than one feature: 3 metrics (tf-idf, weirdness, prototypical
words) correspond to a number of features per metrics (only one of
the metrics is used as they are diferent ways to generate keywords
as features), and the remaining 22 − 3 = 19 metrics correspond
to only one feature per metric. Table 1 lists all the metrics under
three categories, which are explained in more details below. Three
techniques were used for keyword extraction: prototypical words
approach, weirdness scores and tf-idf scores. Based on these tech-
niques three diferent keyword lists (each contains 200 words, 100
for the cyber security related class and 100 for the non-cyber secu-
rity related class) were extracted from the training sets. These lists
were used to generate feature sets for each user by calculating the
term frequency of each keyword in the lists by taking the number
of times a keyword occurs in a timeline divided by the total number
of words in that timeline. In total we used 200 + 19 = 219 features
for the classiication task, and the 200 keywords are generated by
just one technique. Ωe also tried merging keywords generated by
all the three techniques to have an enlarged list of keywords, which
gave us 504 keywords (less than 3 × 200 = 600 due to overlaps
among the three lists) and 19 + 504 = 523 features in total.
2.3.1 Profile Features. Proile features were extracted from pro-
ile information that Twitter provides. In the literature it is a very
common practice to use proile features and features originated
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Table 1: Feature list
Proile Features Behavioral Features Content Features
number of alphabetic characters number of tweets lexical diversity
number of numeric characters number of retweets Flesch-Kincaid score
number of capitalization average number of hashtags SMOG index
number of friends average number of urls prototypical words
number of followers average time between tweets weirdness score
friends/followers ratio standard deviation between tweets tf-idf
use of the avatar picture fraction of tweets posted in 24 hours
presence of location
length of user name
from proile information. These features are the very irst step to
represent users in Twitter since they do often give distinctive infor-
mation about the user. For instance, usage of the numeric characters
instead of some letters is a common practice among cyber security
related users. Two concrete examples are: 3 (which is basically the
reverse of the letter 'E') is used instead of łež, and 4 is used instead
of łaž (which look alike in many font styles).
2.3.2 Content Based Features. These features were extracted
from the content of the user's Twitter feed and represent user's
lexical usage and main interests. This study used a set of 6 met-
rics under this category including lexical diversity, Flesch-Kincaid
grade level score, SMOG (Simple Measure of Gobbledygook) index,
frequency of some keywords extracted using 3 diferent techniques
(prototypical words, weirdness score and tf-idf).
The lexical diversity is the percentage of unique words or terms
out of total words in a document. It has been used in the literature
for spam detection [3]. The Flesch-Kincaid grade level and SMOG
are two popular readability formulas that measure the text di culty
through sentence and word length.
Prototypical words were extracted following the method re-
ported in [11]. Prototypical keywords can be good features for
such classiication tasks because they relate to typical lexical ex-
pressions for users in a speciic class. Given n classes, each class ci
is represented by a set of seed users Si . Each word w is assigned
a score for each class that estimates the conditional probability of
the class given the word as follows:
proto(w, ci ) =
|w, Si |∑n
j=1 |w, Sj |
, (1)
where |w, Si | is the number of times the wordw is issued by users
for class ci . In our study, we chose the highest scoring 100 words
as the prototypical words. A user u is assigned a score for each
prototypical wordw which is computed as follows;
f˙proto˙wp(w,u) =
|w,wp |∑
w ∈Wu |u,w |
, (2)
where |w,wp | is the number of times the prototypical word w is
issued by user u, andWu is the set of all words issued by u. In order
to evaluate the performance of the prototypical words in the cyber
security related account classiication task, we extracted keywords
with two other techniques as well including weirdness and tf-idf
scores.
Ωeirdness is a termhood-based method based on the assumption
that the distributions of terms in a specialized corpus (domain)
and in a general corpus (background) difer signiicantly from each








where fs (i) and fд(i) are the frequencies of the i-th word in the
specialized and the general corpus, respectively, ns is the total
number of words in specialized corpus and nд is the total number
of words in the general one.
The tf-idf feature is the acronym of łterm frequency - inverse
document frequencyž widely used for information retrieval tasks.
It is deined as the product of the term frequency tfw,d , which is
deined here as the raw count of wordw in a document d divided by
the total number of words in d , and the inverse document frequency





where N is the total number of documents, and Nw is the number
of documents mentioning the wordw at least once. In the training
phase, we considered a document to be the set of tweets shared by
all the accounts belonging to a speciic class. Since there are only
2 classes (cyber security related and non-cyber security related),
there are only 2 documents, i.e., N = 2 and Nw ≤ 2. The idf is
calculated based on the training set and then used as a constant in
the testing phase. For the term frequency, in the testing phase we
treat each target account's timeline as the document d .
2.3.3 Behavioral Features. Behavioral features are extracted
from the timeline of the target user account and provide statis-
tics about how the user interacts with Twitter. There are 5 diferent
behavioral features used in this study. Basically a user can tweet,
retweet or mention other users. In addition, they can share diferent
types of contents like a tweet with hashtags and URLs. All of these
metrics were evaluated using these features.
Ωhile the numbers of retweets and hashtags may give insights
about the sociability of a user, the standard deviation of the inter-
tweet time interval (in seconds) and the fraction of tweets belonging
to the last 24 hours (out of all tweets) can represent the level of
activeness of the user. Such information is useful for training a
model for classiication of cyber security related accounts since
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Table 2: All features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.5 0.66667 0.5 1
Decision
Trees
0.96462 0.96445 0.9673 0.96226
Random
Forests
0.95519 0.95425 0.97058 0.93868
Table 3: Proile features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.50472 0.66878 0.50238 1
Decision
Trees
0.57075 0.56295 0.57049 0.5566
Random
Forests
0.65566 0.67436 0.64404 0.71226
Table 4: Behavioral features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.5 0.66667 0.5 1
Decision
Trees
0.9717 0.97196 0.96801 0.97642
Random
Forests
0.97877 0.97875 0.98122 0.97642
those users are information providers who tend to post tweets more
often than information seekers.
3 RESULTS
Supervised classiication of cyber security related accounts on Twit-
ter is the main purpose of this work. For this purpose, 3 machine
learning techniques were applied to 7 diferent subsets of features
presented in Table 1.
In order to evaluate the importance of diferent sets of features
on the classiication task, several experiments were conducted and
their results are summarized in Tables 2-5, for all 523 features
and diferent subsets (9 proile features, 7 behavioral features, and
3+504 = 507 content based features). Table 4 shows that behavioral
features in particular perform best whereas results obtained with
content features are also encouraging. Table 2 shows that combining
all features makes the results slightly worse.
As described above, content based features include automatically
extracted keywords using 3 diferent techniques. In order to com-
pare their performances, 3 diferent experiments were conducted
for each keyword extraction technique, where only 19 + 200 = 219
features were used. The results are shown in Tables 6-8. It is clear
that all the three methods worked well, although the weirdness
score based method performed slightly worse.
It is clear from the results that random forests and decision
trees performed much better than SVM. SVM performed so badly
maybe because the kernel we used does not match the ideal kernel
Table 5: Content features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.69575 0.76102 0.62759 0.96698
Decision
Trees
0.93632 0.93618 0.94049 0.93396
Random
Forests
0.96226 0.96261 0.95394 0.9717
Table 6: Proto and other features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.5 0.66667 0.5 1
Decision
Trees
0.9717 0.97124 0.98075 0.96226
Random
Forests
0.97642 0.97672 0.96362 0.99057
Table 7: tf-idf and other features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.5 0.66667 0.5 1
Decision
Trees
0.9717 0.97142 0.98103 0.96226
Random
Forests
0.97642 0.97667 0.97262 0.98113
Table 8: Weirdness and other features
Accuracy F1 Precision Recall
SVM 0.5 0.66667 0.5 1
Decision
Trees
0.96226 0.96212 0.96241 0.96226
Random
Forests
0.95755 0.95754 0.95795 0.95755
describing the boundary between the two classes. The performance
diferences between random forests and decision trees are minimal,
although it appears that random forests are more stable across all
diferent settings and decision trees performed slightly better when
all features are considered.
Among the three feature categories, behavioral features per-
formed the best, followed by the content based features. It may be
seen as a surprising result that behavioral features alone can sup-
port the classiication task so well. This may be interpreted based
on a reasonable hypothesis that cyber security experts tend to use
Twitter (much) more frequently than others. Ωe plan to verify this
hypothesis in our future work.
4 LIMITATIONS
Although the results of our work are very promising, we acknowl-
edge that there are limitations of the work, which could make it
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harder to generalize our results; thus, further investigations are
needed for these issues.
A major issue is about the łnaturalž ratio between cyber security
related and non-cyber security related accounts on Twitter. Ωe
expect that the ratio is far from balanced (i.e., 1:1) because it is
very likely that the number of non-cyber security related accounts
is signiicantly higher than the number of cyber security related
accounts. Therefore, as long as the false positive rate and the false
negative rate are not equal, which is what we have observed in
our experiments, the realistic accuracy of the trained classiiers
will difer from what we report above, where the realistic accuracy
is deined as the probability that a uniformly randomly selected
Twitter account is classiied correctly. This issue is actually not
simple to address because łaccounts on Twitterž are not well deined
since one should consider only active accounts but the word łactivež
is vague. In addition, Twitter API does not provide a reliable way
to estimate the number of active accounts, so we can only estimate
it using indirect methods. In future, we plan to investigate this
issue more, by developing some reasonable sampling methods and
verifying the performance of the trained classiier in the wild.
Another issue is about the keywords used. The number 200 was
selected heuristically, and it is probably better to make it dynamic
based on some selection criteria. Having dynamic keywords is
important since the cyber security domain is evolving rapidly, so
new keywords keep emerging while some get out-dated quickly.
This also implies that we will end up with a diferent number of
features dynamically, so the classiier needs retraining from time to
time. As a consequence, we need to look at incremental learning to
keep the classiication model updated. In our future work we will
also look at this direction and see what we can do.
A third limitation is about the machine learning models we used.
Ωhile both random forests and decision trees produced very good
results, there may be other models (including hybrid models e.g. in
ensemble learning) that can perform even better. For instance, if
we can collect a large database, deep learning may allow us to train
a more accurate model. In addition, the poor performance of the
SVM may be due to the mismatch of the kernel and parameters we
used, so there is also space to improve. Our future work will also
cover investigation into this line.
Yet another issue (not a limitation per se) is about how we la-
belled a Twitter account as cyber security related. Ωhat łcyberž
means is clearly not well deined, and diferent people will have
diferent opinions. In this work, we used a single cyber security
expert for the labelling task. This may make our results biased,
namely, the trained classiier actually learns about that single in-
dividual's judgment rather than that of an average (typical) cyber
security expert. One solution to this issue is to ask more cyber
security experts to do the labelling and use their average opinions
as the ground truth. The dynamic requirement we mentioned above
implies that we need to consider a human-in-the-loop approach,
e.g., via expert-based crowdsourcing.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, automatic detection of cyber security related accounts
on Twitter is investigated based on three diferent sets of feature
and three diferent machine learning methods. Experimental results
showed very promising performance with high accuracy over 95%.
The highest score (over 97%) was achieved by applying the random
forests method to behavioral features.
Maintaining a list of cyber security related accounts manually
requires domain-speciic knowledge and takes human eforts. Our
work suggests that we can automatically maintain such a list, and
use it for more complicated analysis on things such as cyber security
related events and human behaviors of cyber criminals and cyber
security experts, via automated monitoring of accounts in the list.
In our future work, we will look at how to apply the work reported
in this paper for automated cyber security event detection. Ωe also
call for the wider community to explore other applications of the
automatic detection method in OSN research.
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